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Abstract 
This paper highlights the economic and demographic constraints 
which were placed on the Commonwealth Government in its role 
as the planner and developer of Canberra during the first decade 
after the Second World War. These constraints place the 
establishment of the National Capital Development Commission in 
perspective, by qualifying the role attributed to various individuals 
(such as Prime Minister Robert Menzies). 
In this more structural light, the 1955 Senate Inquiry into the 
Future Development of Canberra is an important event, not simply 
for the rejuvenation of the Canberra vision and the recognition of 
the need for a National Capital, but for the preparatory 
framework of the organisational form which Canberra’s planning 
and development body would assume in the future. However, the 
timing of the establishment of this body — the NCDC — was 
fortuitous, in the sense that the constraints which previously had 
held back Canberra’s development during the first post-war 
decade were beginning to disappear. 
In the paper, these claims are supported by examining the housing 
crisis which Canberra faced during this period. This crisis 
assumed a number of guises, from the housing shortage to 
discontent over rentals, and from the form housing took to 
participation in local decision-making. These issues are explored 
from the perspective of local builders, workers and residents. 
Indeed, a close examination of the evidence before the 1955 Senate 
Inquiry reveals the important contribution which Canberran 
residents made to the final recommendations. However, most 
commentators have tended to focus attention on the evidence 
presented by the planning profession. 
IV 
The Accommodation of Growth: Canberra’s ‘Growing Pains’ 
1945-1955* 
Alastair Greigf 
Introduction 
Between 1945 and 1970, the face of Canberra altered dramatically. The 
population grew from 13,000 to 130,000; key Commonwealth government 
departments were transferred to the National Capital; Canberra began to 
perform effectively its function as the administrative centre of the nation: 
some progress was made towards fulfilling Burley Griffin s landscape plan 
and numerous ornamental features of the city were established. However, 
growth during this significant quarter-century did not occur at a steady 
pace. It remained sluggish until the late 1950s, before rising steeply during 
the following years, exceeding even the expectations of the statutory 
planning and development authority, the National Capital Development 
Commission (NCDC). In the light of this spectacular growth after the 
establishment of the NCDC in 1957, the construction programme during the 
first post-war decade in Canberra appears rather unimpressive. During this 
period, plans which had been drawn up for the transfer of public servants 
and for the construction of the city largely remained unfulfilled. According 
to the architect Robin Boyd, Canberra ‘reached its nadir about 1954'.* 1 
Despite this, Canberra experienced high levels of population growth, which 
in turn fuelled an acute housing shortage. 
This paper focuses on the problems governments encountered — and the 
criticisms levelled against them — in their role as the major provider of 
Canberra’s housing stock between 1945 and 1955. It also examines some of 
the concerns expressed — and the hardships endured — by Canberra's 
residents, its builders and its workforce throughout this period. Their 
experiences shed light on many of the practical problems associated with 
An earlier version of this paper, entitled ‘Consolidating the Past’, was presented at the 
Urban History/Urban Planning Conference, 27-30 June, 1995, The Australian 
National University, Canberra. I am grateful for comments made on a later draft by 
Max Neutze, Nicholas Brown, Freeman Wylie and Andrew Hopkins. 
t Department of Sociology, The Faculties, The Australian National University 
1 R. Boyd, The Australian Ugliness, Melbourne, 1960 (1968), p. 28. 
building die National Capital and housing its residents in the immediate 
post-war period. 
These experiences of Canberrans also provide a context for 
understanding the importance of the 1955 Senate Select Committee 
Appointed to Inquire into and Report upon the Development of Canberra 
(hereafter referred to as the 1955 Senate Inquiry). In turn, the 1955 Senate 
2 
Inquiry ‘marks a major turning point in the history of Canberra’, setting 
up a chain of events which eventually led to the establishment of the NCDC. 
Thus, this paper also contributes towards a ‘pre-history’ of the NCDC. 
More importantly, this paper points out the important contribution which 
local residents, workers and builders made to the debate over Canberra’s 
future. This focus is important, not only because Canberra’s residents were 
at the time among the most politically voiceless in the nation, but also 
because they have been marginalised in most historical accounts of the 
development of their own city. 
As a consequence, this paper qualifies individualist and/or idealist 
accounts of Canberra’s post-war history, which explain the city’s 
spectacular growth after the late 1950s through reference to such factors as: 
the sudden conversion of Prime Minister Menzies into an ‘apostle’ of 
Canberra;2 3 the contributions made by town planners and other experts 
before the 1955 Senate Inquiry and the subsequent report by Lord Holford 
on Canberra’s future; and the administrative reforms of 1957-1958 which 
overcame the problem of divided Departmental responsibilities for 
Canberra’s development. None of these factors can be ignored in an 
adequate explanation of the establishment of the NCDC and the success of 
the plan to finally transform Canberra into the nation’s administrative 
centre. However, this paper argues that, while they might be necessary 
components of an explanation, they are not sufficient. 
In her examination of the ‘lag’ in Canberra’s development up until the 
mid-to-late 1950s, Atkins asks: 
2 
K.F. Fischer, Canberra: Myths and Models, Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg, 
1984. This near-universal verdict is also expressed by local historians L. WigmoreA 
The Long View: Australia's National Capital, Melbourne, 1963; and E. Sparke, 
Canberra 1954-1980, Canberra, 1988; the architect R. Boyd, op. cit., p. 29; the 
historian/political scientist H. Stretton, Ideas for Australian Cities, Adelaide, 1970, 
pp. 28-31; the NCDCs first Commissioner Sir John Overall, Canberra: Past, Present 
and Future, Canberra, 1995, and the NCDC, The Future Canberra, Canberra, 1964. 
3 Sir Robert Menzies, The Measure of the Years, London, 1972, p. 143. 
Perhaps the conditions for the successful development of Canberra were not 
present before the 1950s. Instead of asking “Why was there so long a 
delay?", we should ask “Why was the breakthrough possible in the 1950s? 
What conditions made things easier?” Too much emphasis can be placed on^ 
political choice, and too little on the conditions making some choices viable. 
This paper argues that these ‘conditions can best be understood through 
appreciating tire problems experienced by the people directly involved in 
the construction and growth of Canberra during this period. An exogenous 
shock recharging tine ‘Canberra vision was not required. Canberrans had 
an acute sense of what was wrong with the city, and planners could add 
little to the local store of knowledge concerning the measures needed to 
fulfil the Canberra vision. This argument will be illustrated through an 
analysis of the local housing shortage, and through references to local 
contributions to the 1955 Senate Inquiry. An analysis of the Inquiry’s final 
recommendations reveals the substantial influence of local testimony. 
The Dilemmas of Urban Growth 
This section places Canberra’s post-war housing crisis in historical 
perspective through highlighting a number of dilemmas of growth which 
would have confounded the most dedicated, enlightened and far-sighted 
leaders and town planners. 
By the end of the Second World War. Canberra remained largely a set of 
ideas waiting to be implemented. During an initial period of growth during 
the mid-to-late 1920s, the Federal Capital Commission (FCC) constructed a 
temporary Parliament House, a handful of government offices, hotels and 
residential houses. This spurt of activity proved short-lived, and the onset 
of the Depression forced the Government to reassess its priorities. 
Responsibility for the development of Canberra was divided between a 
number of Commonwealth government departments based in other capital 
cities, and little was added to the city’s built environment during the 
remainder of the 1930s. 
Although the Second World War and the programme for post-war 
reconstruction strengthened the Commonwealth’s power over tire States, 
Commonwealth departments remained dispersed in other capitals and 
looked upon the prospect of a move to Canberra with some reluctance. At 
4 
R. Atkins, The Government of the Australian Capital Territory, St Lucia, 1978, p. 44. 
3 
the 1955 Senate Inquiry, the Chairman of the Public Service Board pointed 
out that there had never been any official departure from the policy of 
transferring the central administrative machinery of government to 
Canberra. While this policy had remained constant, there had been 
'vicissitudes which have delayed achievement of the objective’.5 While 
some politicians and departments lacked enthusiasm for the overall project 
— often referred to as ‘the dead hand of Melbourne’ — there were other, 
more structural, reasons behind the ‘vicissitudes’ which limited Canberra’s 
potential growth during the first decade after the war. 
It was estimated that Australia faced a shortage of approximately 300,000 
houses at the end of the Second World War and demand for building labour 
and materials continued to outstrip supply well into the 1950s throughout 
7 
the nation. However, there were certain circumstances which made 
Canberra’s post-war housing crisis peculiar, including its high level of 
population growth and the central responsibility which the Commonwealth 
Government assumed for coordinating growth. 
The task confronting the Departments for the Interior and Works — the 
two key departments involved in the development of the city — were 
daunting. They were asked to balance the increase in the housing stock with 
an expansion of office-building, community services, local amenities and 
other services. In addition, the Commonwealth had to consider the needs of 
the existing local residents and balance these against the projected needs of 
the public servants it planned to transfer to the Capital Territory. During 
1947 and 1948 the Commonwealth had called for the transfer of 7,027 
public servants to Canberra in four stages within ten years. This 
programme came to be known as ‘Operation Administration’, because its 
success was predicated on the completion of the large Administrative 
Building close to Parliament House. The foundations for this building had 
been laid in the 1920s! If the transfer targets were to be achieved, then it 
Mr. W.E. Dunk, Minutes of the 1955 Senate Inquiry, p. 2 (between pp. 514-515). 
Australian Archives, Mitchell, ACT. No. A1203/3 711.409947 AUS PT1-9. 
When J. Fraser MP (ACT), in the spring of 1954, admonished his parliamentary 
colleagues for not spending more time in Canberra between parliamentary sittings, his 
comments were greeting with a 'derisive outburst’ from the Government benches. See 
also Sparke, p. 23. 
A.W. Greig, The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of: Housing Provision in Australia 1945- 
1960, Melbourne, 1995. 
4 
was also necessary to take into consideration the needs of the additional 
workforce which would be required to fulfil the building programme. 
Canberra had grown rapidly during the Second World War and its 
population reached 13,000 by 1945. By September 1951, this figure had 
risen to 23,616, and by June 1954 the population exceeded 28,000 (see 
Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2). This 85 per cent increase during the 
previous seven years was higher than any other capital city with the 
exception of Darwin. However, high rates of population growth were 
experienced throughout the nation during this period. As a consequence, 
the Government could not rely on a steady redistribution of building labour 
and materials from established centres to undertake the development of 
Canberra. 
Furthermore, the private sector within Canberra remained relatively 
underdeveloped. The Commonwealth Housing Commission Report of 1944 
had predicted that during the post-war era the State Housing Commissions 
would construct approximately half the nation's housing stock. No Housing 
Commission during the first decade after the war came close to realising 
this goal and the private sector — along with owner-builders — took 
9 
responsibility for the majority of house construction. In Canberra, with its 
reliance on the Commonwealth budget, there was little hope in waiting for 
the private sector to initiate the task of construction — especially during a 
time of housing shortages throughout the rest of the country. As long as 
These figures exclude rural ACT and Jervis Bay. The 1954 Census also did not take 
into account the 400 people in the diplomatic corps. Apart from new arrivals, the ACT 
had also experienced the highest birth rates between 1946 and 1951. See J. Gibbnev, 
Canberra J913-1953, Canberra, 1988, p. 235. 
9 
M. Jones, Housing and Poverty in Australia, Melbourne, 1972, p. 16. 
10 
At the 1955 Senate Inquiry, the Chairman of the Public Service Board, Mr Dunk, 
stated: ‘I can see no escape in a development as big as that which is required for the 
completion of Canberra from the Government assuming the main responsibility for 
housing construction’. Private development would follow, he believed, ‘but initially 
however, people coming to Canberra will expect houses to be provided for them’ 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, pp. 6-7, between pp. 514-5. The editor of The 
Canberra Times during the late-1940s, an ardent believer in the virtues of private 
enterprise, enjoyed pointing out—rather unfairly—that Canberra was a grand 
opportunity for the Labor Government to display the virtues of State control. The 
Commonwealth Housing Commission predicted that the States would construct half of 
a future in Australia (CHC Report 1944). Yet, the Commonwealth ’took the 
lot for the ACT (May 9, 1946). Indeed, there was a time when Governments told the 
people that private enterprise had failed in housing and that Government programmes 
were the only means whereby homes for the people could be realised’ This was 
5 
Table 1 
The Growth of Canberra’s Suburbs Between 1947 and 1954 
City Area 1M7 mi 
Acton 1,135 1,291 
Ainslie 2,626 4,060 
Braddon 828 859 
Capital Hill 38 434 
City 16 28 
Deakin 187 412 
Duntroon 648 957 
Forrest 950 1,027 
Fyshwick 991 880 
Griffith 2,551 2,943 
Kingston 1,024 826 
Lyneham, Dickson and O’Connor 10 3,396 
Narrabundah 196 3,382 
Parkes 17 221 
Pialligo 168 328 
Red Hill 237 328 
Reid 901 1,328 
Symonston 211 297 
Turner 735 1,935 
Yarralumla 320 2,081 
Total City Area 15,156 28,277 
Total Rural Area 1,380 1,521 
Jervis Bay 360 517 
Grand Total 16,905 30,315 
Source: Canberra Times, 25 September, 1954, p,2. 
housing demand remained high throughout the nation, and as long as other 
* 
major national projects such as the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme 
remained a priority, the Commonwealth would face the problem of 
attracting sufficient skilled labour and experienced contractors to Canberra. 
clearly a misinterpretation of the aims of the Commonwealth Housing Commission 
and other housing reformers, who merely noted that the private sector could not be 
relied on to adequately meet the needs of certain sectors of the working class. 
6 
Figure 1 
Canberra 1946 
From J. Gibbney, Canberra 1913-1953, Canbera, 1988, p. 205. 
7 
rigure Z 
Canberra 1954 
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Adapted from Gibbney, ibid. 
8 
In addition, the national housing shortage meant that available building 
resources were directed at residential construction. This aggravated the 
backlog of non-residential building throughout the nation. The problems 
this created were nowhere more evident than in Canberra. For the city to 
perform its role as Australia’s governmental and administrative centre, it 
required offices for the transferred Commonwealth public servants. During 
the late 1940s, the slow progress on the construction of the Administration 
Buildin° served as a sorry reminder of the state of the Commonwealth s 
® 11. 
plans to relocate government departments to Canberra. At this stage, 
disused Army huts were being redeployed as offices. 
The Commonwealth was even unable to claim success in diverting scarce 
building resources into the construction of dwellings in Canberra. 
Although no government department had been relocated to the capital and 
the Administration Building had still to be completed, it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that the local housing situation was deteriorating. By 
1954, ACT’s ratio of persons per home — 4.07 — was the highest in the 
Commonwealth. More alarmingly, the number of houses delivered over to 
the Department of the Interior began to decline after reaching a peak of 512 
units in 1952-1953 (see Table 2). The Canberra Times remarked in May 
1955 that the ‘most impressive feature of the housing programme in recent 
years has been that every time the Minister for Works has promised that 
housing output will be increased, it has fallen with relentless persistency’. 
The post-war housing crisis had serious repercussions for the transfer of 
public servants from other centres. It hampered the ability of the 
Commonwealth to recruit staff for Canberra. As early as May 1946, the 
Commonwealth Government Printer lamented that the shortage of 
accommodation was preventing him from attracting prospective employees. 
Interested applicants ‘had been directed to the Housing section of the 
Department of the Interior, and when told that they could not expect a 
12 
house for at least 18 months, they elected to take positions elsewhere’. 
This problem plagued recruitment throughout the initial decade after the 
war. Apart from the shortages, the high rentals on post-war government 
houses were seen as a disincentive for persons contemplating the move to 
11 
The first task of confronting the post-war problem of completing the building involved 
digging up the original concrete foundations laid in the late 1920s. 
CT, May 31, 1946. See also Gibbney, p. 233. 
9 
Canberra. In November 1954, the ACT branch of the Commonwealth 
Public Service Clerical Association warned in its Annual Report that: 
‘Public servants likely to be transferred to Canberra would seriously 
consider whether their prospects in the Commonwealth Public Service 
justified the additional cost of housing in some isolated Canberra suburb’. 
The resistance of many Melbourne and Sydney public servants to proposed 
transfers must be seen in the light of the perceived absence of any ‘pull’ 
factors from Canberra. The 1955 Senate Inquiry also made the point that if 
the new Administration Building were completed, ‘the lack of housing 
would prevent its being fully utilised’.13 
Table 2 
Housing Units Delivered to the Department of the Interior 
1945-1954 
1945-1946 58 
1946-1947 136 
1947-1948 248 
1948-1949 284 
1949-1950 393 
1950-1951 499 Under construction 1,044 
1951-1952 477 664 
1952-1953 512 313 
1953-1954 460 421 
1954 (Jul-Dec) 169 
Source: K.F. Fisher, op.cit 
Apart from the shortage of residential homes and office buildings, the 
Commonwealth had to contend with the acute shortages of infrastructure, 
services and amenities throughout the ACT. There was also a shortage of 
13 The Senate Report from the Select Committee Appointed to Inquire into and Report 
upon the Development of Canberra, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, September 1955, p. 17. 
10 
public halls and other entertainment facilities, which reinforced the 
impression that Canberra was nothing more than a group of isolated 
suburbs ‘looking for a city’.14 Local Progress and Welfare Associations 
blamed incidences of local vandalism on the absence of amenities for 
youths/5 and at the 1955 Senate Inquiry a local builder, Mr McDonald, 
agreed with Chairman Senator McCallum’s comment that ‘the bad thing 
about this place from the point of view of young people is that there is no 
shopping centre, no beautifully lit neon-signs on buildings, and not enough 
restaurants and dance halls — the legitimate things that young people are 
attracted by’.16 
Thus, the failure to establish Canberra as the administrative centre of the 
nation wasn’t merely a question of lack of will on the part of the 
Government, public servants or planners. Prevailing economic and 
demographic circumstances, combined with the nationwide building 
shortage, would have set limits on more modest schemes for Canberra's 
development. Furthermore, as the next section will illustrate, the 
administration of Canberra suffered from divided departmental 
responsibilities and short-term budgetary concerns. There was no 
administrative body with undivided authority to balance the scarce 
financial, material and human resources needed to execute Operation 
Administration. These concerns were voiced by a range of local builders 
and workers’ organisations at the 1955 Senate Inquiry. However, the 
evidence presented so far suggests that prevailing conditions would have 
17 
troubled the most ‘powerful, responsible and competent’ planning 
authority. 
14 
There were a number of variations on this theme including Wigmore ‘Six suburbs in 
search of a city’, op. cit., p. 7, Menzies, ‘six villages in search of a city’, op. cit., p. 
143; See also Sparke, op. cit., p. 1. Los Angeles has often been dubbed* ‘a hundred 
suburbs in search of a city’. See E. Soja, Postmodern Geographies, London, 1989, p. 
21.0 « 
15 
After a spate of vandalism on a building site at Ebden Street, Ainslie in June 1946 was 
blamed on 13-14 year old boys, the Ainslie Progress and Welfare Association turned 
attention towards the lack of facilities for Canberra youth: ‘Throughout Canberra 
generally, the youth are afflicted with boredom because of the lack of facilities for 
healthy amusement and sport’ (CT,_ July 9, 1946). 
16 1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1363. 
17 
Taken from a letter from Prime Minister R.G. Menzies to the Minister for the Interior, 
Allen Fairhall, 14, August 1957, where Menzies outlined his view's on ‘the type of 
Commission required to take over the development of Canberra’. Quoted in J. Overall 
11 
Permanent Homes and Temporary Expedients 
On the eve of the 1955 Senate Inquiry, there was a range of conflicting 
perspectives on the Commonwealth’s record of housing in Canberra. On 
the one hand, the Minister for the Interior, Mr Kent Hughes pointed out in 
Parliament in September 1954 that ‘the Government had been responsible 
for the erection of more permanent homes than in the previous 20 years of 
Canberra’s history’. W. Borrie, Professor of Demography at the 
Australian National University endorsed this view at an ANZAAS 
conference on Canberra in January 1954, arguing that the ‘rapid increase of 
population since 1947 has of course only been made possible by the success 
19 
of the post-war housing programme’. On the other hand, The Canberra 
Times retorted that ‘...in not one post-war year has the housing target ever 
been approached’. Many local residents and workers questioned the 
‘success’ Borrie acclaimed. No local issue attracted as much attention in the 
paper as the ‘housing situation’ throughout the first decade after the war. 
This section reviews some of the most prominent issues through local 
lenses, and highlights the practical recommendations made by builders’ and 
workers’ organisations at the 1955 Senate Inquiry. While expert planners 
tended to debate symbolism and space, Canberrans focused their demands 
on decent houses and a place to live. 
20 
‘The Cheap and Shoddy 
In an effort to overcome the dilemma of housing provision for public 
servants and other residents while finding accommodation for the workers 
recruited to build these houses, the Government experimented with a range 
of ‘temporary expediencies’. However, this solution brought other aesthetic 
and equity problems in its wake. These were associated with the tendency 
for the temporary and the expedient to become permanent, especially when 
the demands of growth encouraged the recycling of temporary 
Arthur Calwell responded that many of the programmes the Minister spoke of were 
initiated under the Chifley Labor Government. 
W.D. Borrie, ‘Population of the Australian Capital Territory and of Canberra’, in 
H.L. White ed., Canberra: A Nation s Capital, Angus and Robertson, n.p., 1954, p. 
227. Borrie did concede that: ‘Supply is still behind demand and standards may be 
criticised...’. 
Senator McCallum, the future Chairman of the 1955 Senate Committee, expressed his 
view—when moving for the Committee's appointment on November 3, 1954—that 
the ‘cheap and shoddy were dearest in the long run'. 
12 
accommodation. This problem had plagued the National Capital ever since 
Burley Griffin and then Sulman proposed the ‘initial city’ around the 
21 
district of Kingston. 
One-tenth of the 2,111 government-owned houses in July 1946 had been 
defined as temporary dwellings. In addition, throughout the Territory a 
number of hostels, camps and ‘guest houses’ were used as temporary 
accommodation.22 By 1951, over one in five of the local population were 
living in hostels. This accommodation tended to be occupied either by 
workers engaged in building programmes, or by public servants and other 
workers who had lodged an application for a government-owned house. 
This accommodation was subsidised by the Government, although public 
servants tended to occupy better quarters than construction workers. 
Under these circumstances, hostels, camps and guest houses appeared 
expedient for housing the workforce required to build permanent 
accommodation." As each large influx of building labour was recruited, 
additional temporary accommodation had to be found. For example, when 
plans were announced in August 1946 for the reception of a large group of 
British building tradesmen, the Government transported the disused 
military camp at Narellan to a location near tire sandwash plant between the 
Molonglo River and the Prices Office buildings as accommodation. In 
1951, skilled labour shortages also encouraged A.V. Jennings to bring 150 
carpenters from Germany in order to fulfil their large housing contract in 
As early as 1904, before the Canberra site was chosen, the Inspector-General of 
Works, Mr P.T. Owen also rejected the erection of temporary buildings on the future 
capital site. Wigmore, op. cit., p. 45 & p. 50. The ‘permanency’ of the temporary 
was also a feature of Canberra’s initial period of growth between 1925-1930 under the 
FCC. See F. Wylie, ‘The Community Spirit—’’intangible but all important”: Social 
Service Idealism in Canberra 1925-1929’, Canberra Historical Journal, New Series, 
No. 36, September 1995; A. Gugler, The Builders of Canberra 1909-1929: Part One - 
Temporary Camps and Settlements, Canberra, 1994. 
22 
For a map of such hostels and camps, see Fischer op. cit., p. 52. ANZ's first 
Kingston branch was also a prefabricated building, erected in December 1954. It took 
two weeks to erect. See CT, December 16, 1954. 
23 
This wras not a new problem. A similar process of segregation occurred during 
Canberra’s initial period of growth in the late 1920s. See Wigmore, op. cit., p. 124. 
See also Sparke, op. cit., pp. 25-6. 
24 
Tom Hungerford’s novel Rivers lake, (Melbourne, 1953) describes the conditions, the 
atmosphere and the conflicts within such camps in the late-1940s. ‘Riverslake’ was a 
composite of Riverside and Eastlake Hostels. One of his short stories, ‘The National 
Game’, was set in a camp called Eastside. See T. Hungerford, Short Fiction. 
Fremantle, 1989. 
13 
Canberra. On arrival, these workers where also housed in hostels. One 
German carpenter recalled that on arrival at the ‘primitive group of fibro- 
clad barracks’ on Capital Hill ‘everyone was disappointed, we had expected 
better accommodation’. Initially, the Ministry and local contractors 
targeted single men, rather than families, in an attempt to provide labour 
26 
for the city while avoiding additional cost on facilities. 
However, after a decade of experience, numerous witnesses before the 
1955 Senate Inquiry claimed that this method of recruiting labour and 
developing Canberra had serious drawbacks. Aesthetically, Canberra was 
beginning to resemble one large building site. In an industrial broadcast on 
June 20, 1955, Mr H.E. Curran, a carpenter from the Trades and Labour 
Council (TLC), objected to the ‘acres and acres’ of temporary housing 
being erected in the city and stated that ‘this type of structure gives one the 
impression that Canberra is only being constructed as a temporary city’, 
and he feared that the National Capital would be seen as a ‘city of pre¬ 
fabrication’. These sentiments were echoed by the President of the New 
27 
South Wales Master Builders’ Association (MBA). 
More practically, many local witnesses argued before the 1955 Senate 
Inquiry that a substantial proportion of future permanent dwellings 
constructed should be made available to skilled building tradesmen. Most 
agreed with the local Master Builders Association (MBA) that ‘the most 
satisfactory type of skilled tradesman has always been a permanent resident 
of Canberra’. Skilled tradesmen placed in hostels tended to view Canberra 
as a ‘terminal’, and this resulted in tradesmen eventually ‘drifting’ to other 
capital centres. The MBA also demanded more ‘intermingling’ of the 
population. They rejected schemes — such as the ‘Narrabundah fibros’ — 
where ‘you have your building sector segregated in an area surrounded by a 
28 
lot of gum trees and public servants in another area’. On the basis of his 
A. Stuetz ed., The History of the Jennings Germans, Canberra, 1986, p. 19. See also 
Gibbney, op. cit., p. 237. 
By 1954, there were about 2,500 non-British adult migrants in Canberra, coming 
from 24 countries, including 32 persons classified as stateless. The largest national 
groups are the Poles (573), Italians, Dutch and Germans. See also Gibbney, op. cit., 
pp. 238-40. On the masculine character of the city, see ibid, p. 243. 
Gibbney, op. cit., p. 271-2. 
Senator McCallum replied that ‘I would not object to the gum trees. It is the type ol 
housing that is wrong’ (1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1262). 
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Canberra experience, the Melbourne-based builder Mr A.V. Jennings 
agreed that ‘permanent resident tradesmen are desired’ for Canberra to 
overcome its housing problem and accomplish ‘Operation Administration’. 
The ACT TLC was also in broad agreement with the MBA, although it 
was careful to appease existing hostel dwellers with the qualification that 
‘such allocation not be allowed to upset the balance as against those people 
29 
who have been waiting for homes for some time’. Another practical 
su°«estion made bv the TLC to attract permanent tradesmen included a 
‘locality’ allowance of £5 a week rather than a ‘living away from home 
allowance’ in order to discourage the use of Canberra as a terminal. They 
also recommended that encouragement be given for tradesmen to build 
their own houses in the district. 
Thus, by 1955, many local organisations had rejected the notion that 
Canberra’s future growth could be based upon expanding the stock of 
temporary accommodation for building workers, on both aesthetic and 
30 
developmental grounds. As long as work was plentiful throughout the 
nation and the housing shortage continued, there were more attractive 
options for building workers than a Canberra winter in a group of fibro 
barracks.31 
However, as the shortages intensified in April and May 1955, Ainslie 
Hostel was refitted to accommodate more building tradesmen brought over 
from Britain with their families. The difficulty the Commonwealth had 
encountered balancing its various responsibilities manifested itself 
immediately. The transfer of family groups into the underhoused and 
underserviced city was accompanied by protests from the ACT TLC and 
29 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1386. 
30 
By June 1955, the TLC noted that advertisements were beginning to appear for 
building labour with the inducement of a ‘house provided'. However, during the 195 
Senate Inquiry, the TLC also described the case of one building contractor, the 
McConnell Company, w'hich lodged 12 or 13 tradesmen in a house in O'Connor 
(1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1390). 
31 Before the 1955 Senate Inquiry, the TLC stated its belief that it was ‘unreal to expect 
that either builders or tradesmen could be coaxed to leave a place where there is 
already some assured work to come to Canberra and face an intermittent allocation of 
work with consequent intermittent employment’ (1955 Senate inquiry Minutes, p. 
15 
from Parent and Teacher Associations, who argued that it accentuated the 
32 
overcrowding at Ainslie Primary School. 
In April 1955, the front page of The Canberra Times warned that hostel 
residents were complaining of overcrowding: ‘Canberra has never been so 
overcrowded, with hotels, hostels and guest houses filled to capacity — and 
over’. Despite the fact that hostels were subsidised, prolonged exposure 
to these conditions inevitably led to personal frustration. Lack of privacy, 
petty house rules and impermanence can usually only be tolerated when the 
sufferer perceives that a realistic and desirable end is in sight. However, 
population growth, combined with the Government’s priority housing list, 
appeared to consign some residents — especially young single men and 
34 
women — to an endless purgatory of hostels. Ill-defined ‘essential 
workers’ who were transferred, or were attracted, to Canberra often 
received priority over the long-suffering hostel dwellers. The general 
sense of anticipation which began to grip Canberra as the long-awaited 
Administration Building began to take shape was tempered by the 
recognition that this meant more names on the Government housing waiting 
35 
list. One woman, a long-term ‘guest’ of Lawley House had warned The 
Canberra Times in October 1954 that: 
Climate apart, I can see only one factor which might make the reception of a 
couple of thousand or so newcomers somewhat chilly; I refer of course to the 
accommodation problem...Perhaps I am doing the Minister and his 
Department an injustice when I express an awful presentiment that these 
(new 8-storey) flats (at Braddon) are largely intended for the new recruits 
from Melbourne rather than for the need of a sector of Canberra's present 
population which has heretofore been subject to gross lack of consideration. 
The Commonwealth somehow had to crash through this accommodation 
barrier. Canberra was desperately short of houses and non-residential 
32 CT, May 5, 1955, May 14, 1955. 
33 C7, April 27, 1955. 
34 
As Gibbney notes: ‘With private board and lodging becoming rare, most single people 
were condemned to, what seemed to many to be, a life sentence in one or another of a 
number of government barracks, euphemistically called hostels’. Op. cit., p. 231. 
35 
Lawley House on Brisbane Avenue (like Havelock House on Northboume Avenue) 
was a more up-market guest-house built in the late 1940s. During the late 1970s it 
received a new lease of life as Pine Lodge before becoming a Police Training 
Academy. 
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buildings, yet looked for some sign of more public service transfers to 
Canberra as evidence of the Government’s commitment to the National 
Capital. At the same time, more houses and services were needed for the 
people who could construct the necessary dwellings, offices and community 
facilities. 
These dilemmas over priorities were accentuated by two further 
problems which had become acute by 1955: the first concerned the problem 
of attracting sufficient workers, while the second involved the Territory's 
budgetary allocation. In reality, both problems were interconnected. During 
1953 and 1954, as the population continued to expand, the Territory had 
lost 900 tradesmen. The original intention of the Director of Works to 
construct 1,000 homes in Canberra during 1954-1955 had been reduced to a 
mere 300 due to the lack of building tradesmen. Jim Fraser MP (ACT) 
informed the Parliament in early September 1954 that it was estimated that 
the success of ‘Operation Administration1 was dependent on attracting at 
least 3,300 skilled building tradesmen to the Territory. On the eve of the 
1955 Senate Inquiry, there were 6,000 houses in the ACT and the proposed 
transfers would require an extra 4,000 over the next couple of years. 
The local TLC pointed out that the low wages in the district were a 
disincentive to attracting building labour. By September 1954, Canberra 
tradesmen were receiving between £15 15/- and £15 18/- per week, while 
wages for interstate tradesmen ranged from £20 to £28. The TLC claimed 
that this was causing a ‘seepage1 from the local building industry and from 
Canberra as a whole. This problem was also raised by Mr W.I. Byrne, a 
member of the Canberra Advisory Council and a delegate of the TLC. He 
criticised the Government for failing to ‘face the fact that Canberra is a city 
of high prices and low wages’. If the Government was serious about 
developing Canberra then it was a ‘palpable absurdity’ to fix the basic local 
This anticipation was reflected in The Canberra Times editorial of September 23, 
1954. During the brief and hitherto undistinguished life of the present Parliament, a 
somewhat comforting note has been struck by the increased interest that members of 
parliament have been taking in Canberra.’ 
37 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, pp. 1385-6. 
38 
The membership of the Canberra Advisory Council—originally established after the 
demise of the FCC—was at this stage partially elected and partiallv nominated bv the 
Department of the Interior. 
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wage lower than Sydney. However, while these grievances were 
legitimate and needed to be addressed, they failed to attack the problem that 
even if more workers were attracted by higher wages, they still had to be 
accommodated. Canberra could not pull itself up by its bootstraps. This 
combination of population expansion, labour shortages and material scarcity 
placed the Commonwealth on the horns of a dilemma. 
However, comparative wage levels were only part of the reason for the 
alarming decline in the number of tradesmen in the Territory. This 
withdrawal of labour was also a result of the Government’s methods of 
financing Canberra’s development. Each year a set figure was allocated 
from the budget for this purpose, which meant that the city was at the 
mercy of economic circumstances, governmental changes and other political 
priorities. This budgetary system added an element of unpredictability to 
long-term planning. By 1955, the harmful repercussions of the sharp 
budget cuts of 1952-1953 had left their mark upon the city’s construction 
programme. Numerous witnesses before the 1955 Senate Standing 
Committee active in the local building industry highlighted the adverse 
consequences of existing financial arrangements and there was widespread 
support within the building community for changes to the financial and 
organisational administration of the National Capital. Witness after witness 
recalled how the budget cuts of 1952-1953 had led to a dispersal of the local 
building workforce. Mr A.V. Jennings described how he had built up his 
local workforce to 420 men. However, after the budget cuts, ‘the men 
40 
began to move out of the Territory’, and the firm was left with less than 
100 workers. Another contractor also stated that the principal reason why 
‘the housing situation is in its parlous state’ was the serious implications of 
the ‘considerable reduction in the [1952-1953] vote’. Up until then, the 
Department of the Interior had built up its building workforce to well over 
2,000 employees. However, in the wake of the budget ‘the workforce has 
41 
drifted away, and the contractors have drifted away too’. 
CT, November 8, 1954. J. Fraser MP (ACT), responded in Parliament to allegations 
from a Tasmanian Member of local waste and high subsidies by pointing out that: 'The 
citizens of Canberra make their contributions (to the nation) from a basic wage which 
is considerably lower than in the adjoining state of NSW, although prices here are 
generally much higher' (CT, September 18, 1954). 
40 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, pp. 1501-5. 
41 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1344. 
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These statements were supported by the Deputy Director General of the 
Department of Works and the Public Service Board. Mr W.P1 Dunk, 
Chairman of the Public Service Board, argued that the construction 
programme for Canberra required ‘a clear authority for a high level of 
expenditure on a programme based over a period of years, rather than have 
42 
to rely on the fluctuations and uncertainties of annual budgets’. Mr F.J. 
Watters, from the MBA, also criticised the ‘spasmodic’ nature of the works 
programme, and claimed that this remained a major disincentive for large 
43 
contractors establishing permanent operations in Canberra. All local 
witnesses, regardless of political persuasion, spoke of five-year, ten-year 
and even fifteen-year plans as the most effective means of ensuring 
continuity and stability of work. These were the only conditions under 
which contractors and building workers would be attracted to Canberra on 
a long-term or permanent basis. The continuation of the system of annual 
appropriations from the budget would perpetuate the ‘boom and bust’ 
environment which the Territory had experienced during the previous five 
44 
years. 
In addition, many witnesses advocated a return to some form of ‘unified 
control’ for the construction of the city, along the lines of the Federal 
Capital Commission (FCC) which coordinated Canberra’s halcyon era of 
growth during the mid-to-late 1920s. This administrative reform — or 
regeneration — was also supported by evidence from Sir John Butters, 
former Chief Commissioner of the FCC, who also emphatically rejected the 
erection of temporary dwellings. The success of the Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-electric Authority added further weight to the argument for 
administrative reform. However, the SMHA would remain a competitor 
for labour, material and capital resources, and held higher priority than the 
development of the National Capital. 
By the time the 1955 Senate Inquiry sat, Canberra’s residents, builders 
and workers were able to draw upon their practical store of knowledge to 
42 
43 
44 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 5, between pp. 514-5. 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1255. 
In August 1954, Mr J. Fraser MP called for an all-party Parliamentary Committee of 
both Houses to oversee the development of the Capital Territory. Too often under the 
present system of ACT Administration, planning for the future gave way to 
ok)lPHdle JCK f7 today • He advocated a return to the system of planning five years 
ahead and budgeting for that period. K 8 y 
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highlight problems associated with Canberra’s growth. In addition, it did 
not require outside experts to enlighten local residents about problems 
associated with temporary dwellings: for many, this was part of their daily 
experience. 
Innovations in Permanent Housing 
The relationship between temporary and permanent housing was only one 
key controversy surrounding Canberra’s early post-war growth. Another 
debate centred on the forms of permanent housing. This section examines a 
number of guises this debate assumed. 
Immediately after the war, the Commonwealth’s housing programme for 
Canberra resumed on the assumption that most permanent post-war 
government houses would be built using traditional methods and materials. 
Thus, by August 1946, 178 of the 181 houses under construction were clad 
with brick. The remaining three were timber-clad. However, labour and 
material shortages soon forced the Government to search for alternatives. 
As part of its ‘plan to break through the housing hold-up’, the 
Government announced in June 1946 its intention to erect 300 prefabricated 
homes for employees of the Canberra brickworks. This was followed in 
July by an announcement that a site had been surveyed in Narrabundah and 
that tenders had been called for the erection of a group of prefabricated 
houses. (This was the sight of the infamous ‘Narrabundah fibros’ 
mentioned earlier). In mid-1946 a number of articles also appeared in the 
local press concerning the erection of steel houses in Victoria. When a 
member of the Canberra Advisory Council suggested that ‘steel homes be 
erected in Canberra to ease the housing shortage’ he was informed by the 
Ministry for the Interior that no ‘application has been made by any private 
individual to build steel framed houses’. However, at least one Beaufort 
45 
steel house was erected in the Territory. In August 1946, the Minister for 
the Interior, Mr H.V. Johnson, before the Canberra Advisory Council, 
announced that tenders would be called for 100 concrete homes to be 
constructed using ‘Victorian Housing Commission methods’. The Minister 
46 
stressed the importance of the time saved in erection. Over the next ten 
years concrete homes became a familiar part of the residential landscapes oi 
45 
46 
See P. Cuffley, Australian Houses of the Forties and Fifties, Melbourne, 1994). 
CT, August 6, 1946. 
suburbs such as Narrabundah, Yarralumla, Deakin and O’Connor. Other 
‘innovative’ solutions included the erection of over 200 houses in O’Connor 
using materials transported from the Tocumwal air base in NSW. 
During this period, the search for innovative methods and materials was 
stimulated by recurrent problems with the quantity and quality of local 
bricks, and the difficulty of procuring bricks at a reasonable cost from 
other centres such as Goulbum, Bowral and Parkes. In March 1955, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior informed the 
Advisory Council that the current backlog in bricks was approximately 
half-a-million units. During 1954 — a year when the number of brick 
dwellings built actually increased — 24 per cent of houses were monocrete, 
22 per cent were imported pre-fabricated Riley-Newsum houses, 21 per cent 
brick veneer, 20 per cent brick, and 13 per cent concrete. In addition, 119 
flats were constructed. The brick crisis, as well as the shortages of labour, 
encouraged A.V. Jennings to sub-contract a Melbourne firm which 
‘masonry veneered' exterior walls at their McGregor St, ‘New’ Deakin, 
site. It was claimed that this method rivalled brick in permanency and cost, 
as well as possessing the additional advantage of relieving the shortage of 
47 
carpenters and bricklayers. 
The shortage of bricks also discouraged the erection of houses other than 
single dwellings on single blocks of land. Few semi-detached houses were 
constructed during the first post-war decade for this reason. In October 
1954, the Ministry of Works announced that there had never been a change 
of policy on semi-detached houses, and that their lag in production had been 
, 48 
'brought about by the necessity to conserve bricks’. 
Controversy over brick supply was rarely absent from the pages of The 
Canberra Times. Topics ranged from cases of alleged fraud and theft of 
bricks by employees; attempts to purchase bricks outside the ACT by the 
Minister for the Interior; claims that the brick famine was forcing 
bricklayers and other tradesmen to leave the trade or the town, and 
complaints by members of the Canberra Advisory Council that the quality 
of bricks produced by the ‘dry press method’ at the govemment-owrned 
brickworks at Yarralumla was hampering the building trades. In 
CT, May 21, 1955, pi & p. 4. 
48 
Semidetached houses were not for resale. A contract for the erection by June 24, 1955 
of ten semi-detached houses in O'Connor was let to Mr F.A. Somes of Griffith for 
£36,489. These were the first group of semis 'for some time’ in Canberra. 
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September 1954, The Canberra Times attacked ‘the notorious monopoly of 
the brickworks which has been selling bricks to the building trade of 
consistency little better than gingerbread’. 
Despite the problems the Government experienced procuring bricks, and 
despite the availability of alternative forms of cladding, the Ministry of 
Works continued to call for more tenders for brick homes than any other 
form. It had calculated that, in 1953, there was a difference of only £2 per 
49 
square between the erection of a brick home and a timber home. Some 
witnesses before the 1955 Senate Inquiry suggested that while innovative 
materials might be cheaper, extra labour was often involved and tradesmen 
were knot accustomed to that type of construction’, prolonging erection 
50 
time. In addition, the TLC and the Building Workers Industrial Union 
(BWIU) regularly expressed their concern that some firms attracted to the 
Territory to engage in innovative projects were using illegal forms of 
piecework. Industrial disputes arose in 1951 at an A.V. Jennings site and in 
1955 at H.S. Levinsohn’s site in Narrabundah. The TLC maintained that 
day labour remained the most efficient and least expensive organisation of 
51 
construction. Other witnesses argued that brick homes were preferable in 
Canberra’s climate. 
Numerous ‘non-brick’ dwellings were also tainted with the brush of 
expediency and this led to a perception among many residents and 
commentators that non-brick dwellings and innovations were aesthetically 
undesirable in the National Capital. The Narrabundah fibros, the 
‘Tocumwaf houses in O’Connor and the Monocretes spread around the 
post-war suburbs were often used as examples. These claims prompted the 
appearance of the Australian Timber Development Association before the 
Senate Inquiry, in an effort to promote the virtues of timber, or 
weatherboard, homes. According to its Director, Mr C. Davis, the 
* 
advantages of timber houses included their cost, reduced construction time, 
availability of materials, savings on labour and their aesthetic value. 
Another virtue was that timber homes would provide a much clearer and 
consistent television reception due to the natural insulating qualities of 
The worsening brick crisis, and the importation of bricks from outside the Territory 
increased this margin to £7 by 1954. 
50 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1262. 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, pp. 1368-1405. 
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timber. In addition, the occupant of a timber home would have a greater 
feeling of security in the event of an atomic strike upon the city. Mr Davis 
explained: ‘It must be the fervent prayer of all of us that no atom bomb 
should fall on Canberra — indeed nor on any part of Australian soil — but 
it is a possibility that we must consider. Scientists have revealed, as many 
of you have undoubtedly read, that the resident of a timber structure has 
five times greater chance of survival than the inmate of a brick building.’ 
Mr Davis did not explain to the Inquiry how slim that chance of survival 
might be. 
Thus, the shortages in building materials, the poor quality of many 
traditional materials and the difficulties experienced recruiting building 
labour all encouraged the search for new, more efficient, more economical 
methods of producing permanent housing. It also prompted lively 
discussions on the most appropriate materials and forms of housing in the 
local environment. However, as the national housing crisis abated and brick 
supplies improved, the Department of Works — and later the NCDC — 
increased the production of brick veneer dwellings. 
Other Housing Issues 
(a) land-use 
The after-effects of the 1952-1953 budget cuts reverberated beyond the 
issue of labour supply and attracting contractors. The cuts also prompted a 
range of housing and land use controversies. These debates were early 
manifestations of Canberra’s current ‘consolidation' controversies. One 
local contractor argued that: 
The effect of the 1952/53 budget reductions was that a considerable amount 
of money that usually would have been spent on engineering sendees in 
extending water supply services to the outskirts and distant suburbs, was 
reserved for the building of homes ...the Departments were faced with the 
problem of having to find additional homes within the areas already sen iced 
with water and other services. Since then, there has been continual 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1328. Throughout the hearings, the Chairman of the 
Senate Inquiry, Senator J.A. McCallum revealed his own personal bias towards stone 
houses. At one stage, he asked a local contractor about his thoughts on Australia 
g a, COUpIe of thousand stone masons’ (1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 
1364). Similar questions were directed at the TLC and the MBA. 
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encroachment on lands which the people of Canberra have regarded as set 
aside for parks and gardens. 
Controversies over land use and allotment size received prominent 
coverage in the local press during the mid-1950s. One battle involved the 
‘alienation’ of the Solander Place parkland in Yarralumla and its rezoning 
for housing developments. Another ‘consolidation’ effort which aroused 
local controversy involved an innovative housing project at Narrabundah 
Heights, between Captain Cook and Walker Crescents, which was viewed by 
many critics as ‘substandard for the National Capital’. Complaints included 
the small frontages of the houses, their proximity to each other, thoughtless 
siting, unsuitable building materials and the monotony of their design. This 
project was also referred to, and visited by, the 1955 Senate Inquiry. 
During 1954, the proposal to build Canberra’s first multi-storey block of 
flats was also the subject of public attention. While some observers 
questioned the aesthetics of an eight storey block of flats within a ‘garden 
city’, more utilitarian residents — anxious to see more accommodation — 
merely criticised the siting of the flats on the Northside at Braddon, when 
most of the government-employed tenants would be working on the 
Southside. In Parliament during September 1954, Jim Fraser MP claimed 
that the ‘Flats Plan’ would further strain the overburdened local bus 
service. However, one Ainslie resident believed: ‘Better from Civic than 
from “South Yass”, as the Savannah fringe of O’Connor is coming to be 
56 
known’. 
Canberra’s future centrepiece, the planned lake, did not escape the clutch 
of financial constraints. In 1953, the Department of the Interior pushed 
through planning amendments which would have replaced West Basin with 
a ‘ribbon’ of water. The Department attempted to soothe local concerns by 
stating before the Canberra Advisory Council that: ‘Implementation of the 
ribbon of water does not mean the abandonment of the Lakes Scheme. It is 
1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1348. 
54 
Mr Fraser, MP described this action as ‘official vandalism sanctioned by the Minister 
charged with the administration of the National Capital’ (CT, September 1954). See 
also Wigmore, p. 154. The Solander Place controversy was discussed during the 
1955 Senate Inquiry. See evidence of K.J. Mulherin, President of the ACT Progress 
and Welfare Council, in the 1955 Senate Inquiry Minutes, p. 1428. 
See the Final Report of the 1955 Senate Inquiry; see also CT, June 7 and June 8. 
56 CT, July 29, 1954. 
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the first step in what could eventually be the fulfilment of the scheme. 
Canberra, which some feared gave the impression of a temporary city, 
would now receive a ‘temporary’ stretch of water in place of the 
‘permanent’ lake. Although financial and engineering arguments were 
advanced in support of this temporary expediency, more cynical 
commentators pointed out that many influential public servants belonged to 
the Royal Canberra Golf Club, which would have been submerged under 
fifteen feet of water once the original lakes scheme was complete. The 
important question surrounding these issues concerned the ease with which 
the gazetted plan for Canberra could be altered with minimal public 
discussion and consultation. 
(b) local participation 
These debates surrounding local participation, consultation and 
democracy tended to spill over into housing controversies. For example, 
the concerns of residents were raised by the decision taken by the Director 
of Works in the mid-1950s to redesign new government houses without fuel 
stoves. The Department claimed that its decision had been motivated by the 
fact that post-war housing costs had risen considerably — especially during 
the period around 1950 — and, as a consequence, rentals of new houses 
were markedly higher than rentals of older and more substantial pre-war 
homes. In September 1954, the ‘almost powerless’58 Canberra Advisory’ 
Council voted six to two that ‘fuel stoves were necessary in Canberra's 
winter’, and that, where possible, these essential items should be built into 
future government houses. 
This fuel stove issue — as well as the Solander Place and the ‘ribbon of 
water’ controversies — revived the question of who spoke in the interests 
59 • 
of Canberra residents. There was discontent over the fact that the 
57 
Sparke, op. cit., p. 15. 
58 Atkins, op. cit., p. 52. However, as Wigmore points out, “As ... the council’s 
meetings were reported in the press and on the air, it was in a position to mould and 
influence public opinion, and to stimulate interest in local affairs’. Op. cit, p. 158. 
During the halcyon era of growth in the late 1960s, one elected member of the 
Advisory Council remarked that if ‘all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely, then the elected Members of the Australian Capital Territory Advisory 
Council are the only politicians in Australia who can honestly approach their electorate 
pure of heart’.58 
59 
This was a major issue in disputes between local residents, workers, the Canberra 
Social Service movement and the FCC during the late 1920s. See Wvlie, op. cit., p. 
14. 
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Department of Works could declare unilaterally that fuel stoves were 
unnecessary or too expensive. The Advisory Council, in recommending the 
return of the stoves, claimed to have canvassed the views of Canberra 
housewives, and claimed to be representing their needs. However, the ACT 
Progress and Welfare Council, representing the remaining active suburban 
60 
Progress and Welfare Associations, complained that they had not been 
consulted by the Advisory Council on this and other issues such as the siting 
of suburban hotels. 
Another local organisation, the National Council of Women (ACT) had 
taken an active stance on housing issues since the early 1950s, and had 
submitted a report on the inadequacies of government-built housing to the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior in 1951. The NCW (ACT) 
firmly believed that ‘opportunities should be presented to Canberra’s 
residents to participate in the future planning of their city’. Freda 
Stephenson has documented how the NCW (ACT) earned the right ‘to be 
listened to and to be part of the decision-making process in Canberra’ 
through its ability to initiate programmes for change rather than mere 
demands for change. Apart from its concern with housing the aged in 
Canberra, the Council also conducted the first wide-ranging statistical 
survey into the opinions of local residents on their Government houses. 
Before the 1955 Senate Inquiry, the Council’s representatives, Madge 
Horgan and Sheila Wigmore, focused on the inadequate channels of 
communication between the Government and Canberran residents over 
planning issues. Stephenson argues that ‘Council was in the forefront of the 
movement to have citizens consulted about decisions that concerned them 
61 
• • ♦ 
In November 1954, the Advisory Council agreed to provide six copies of 
its minutes to the Progress and Welfare Council after it had been pointed 
out by the Turner branch that the minutes of Advisory Council meetings 
The first Welfare and Progress Association was founded in Reid in 1930. At the 
height of the movement there were 11 suburban associations. (More on the rise and 
decline of the associations). However, by the time of the 1955 Senate Inquiry, this 
number had declined to 4 (Yarralumla, Duntroon, Turner and O’Connor). In April 
1955, the President of the O’Connor Association, Mrs A.R. Browning intormed The 
Canberra Times that the branch was considering disbanding, due to lack of community 
interest. See also Gibbney, op. cit., pp. 246-8. 
F. Stephenson, Capital Women: A History of the Work of the National Council of 
Women (ACT) in Canberra 1939-1979Canberra, 1992. The statistical survey on 
housing was completed after the 1955 Senate Inquiry. 
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could be regarded as the ‘equivalent of Hansard for Canberra residents. 
The President of the Advisory Council, Mr Bailey, voiced his concern that 
in effect this meant the Advisory Council would be forced to refer all 
important matters to the Progress Associations. Advisory Council member, 
Mr A.T. Shakespeare further added that it was unreasonable to hold up 
advice to the Minister by contacting bodies with no constitutional status. 
However, another member, Mr W.I. Byrne, reminded his colleagues of the 
reality that the Minister combining the functions of the Departments of the 
Interior and Works ‘is to all intents a one-man dictatorship of Canberra’. 
‘There must be some way', he suggested, ‘to give the people a voice. The 
62 people of Canberra are political eunuchs.’ Furthermore, until 1949, local 
residents were not formally represented in the Commonwealth parliament, 
and relied on sympathetic parliamentarians, such as Allan Fraser MP (Eden 
Monaro), to voice their concerns. Although the seat of ACT came into 
existence in 1949, restrictions remained on the local members’ voting rights 
63 
until the 1960s. 
The establishment of the NCDC in late 1957 failed to overcome the 
problem of local participation. While the organisation might have provided 
the administrative and planning platform for growth, it was often labelled a 
‘benevolent dictatorship'. However, many local residents during the 1950s 
appeared to accept this lack of rights as a necessary trade-off for growth. 
For example, Mr J.L. Mulrooney, before the 1955 Senate Inquiry, believed 
that the most effective way to administer the affairs of Canberra was 
64 through ka dictator with the milk of human kindness’. Canberra's growth 
and local democracy would remain in a state of tension until the late 1980s. 
It was only after the Commonwealth Government felt that the NCDC had 
completed it’s mission that Canberra residents acquired democratic control 
over their local affairs. 
(c) private housebuilding 
As noted earlier, Canberrans’ reliance on the Commonwealth 
Government for housing was accentuated by the lack of interest 
CT, August 31, 1954. 
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demonstrated by private builders in Canberra. Thus, the issue of ‘political 
sovereignty’ was compounded by the inability to exercise ‘consumer 
sovereignty’. However, between 1945 and 1955 private housebuilding 
began to increase in Canberra, although from very low levels. From an 
average ot 12 per cent of total completions during the early-1950s, the 
number of non-government housing completions rose to almost one-quarter 
in 1954-1955. The growing interest in private building was associated with 
the increase in the number of residential blocks released by the 
Government, a growing sense that the Government was taking a greater 
interest in Canberra, and the announcement by the Commonwealth in 1955 
of changes in the terms for home building loans in the ACT. Blocks 
released in the Southside (apart from Narrabundah) tended to be the most 
popular and commanded the highest premiums, while blocks in the newer 
Northern suburbs such as O’Connor attracted less interest, and were more 
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difficult to clear. 
By 1955, more advertisements began appearing in the local newspaper 
under ‘Houses for Sale’, and ‘Vacant Possession’. For example, in February 
1955, Civil and Civic Contractors were advertising architect-designed brick 
66 
veneer cottages at Boolimba Crescent, Narrabundah. In addition, during 
1955, the Real Estate Agent R.A. McKillop & Co. began advertising, in the 
Saturday Canberra Times, a range of new brick residences in Turner, 
Ainslie and O’Connor for prices ranging from £4,000 to £7,700. However, 
67 
rarely were there more than ten homes advertised at any one time. 
This upward trend in private building prompted the Canberra Chapter of 
the Royal Australian Institute of Architects to investigate the possibility of 
opening an ACT agency of the Small Homes Service. However, these plans 
were dropped in April 1955 when a study of released residential blocks 
65 _ . 
During the mid-1950s, these blocks covered both timber and brick areas. Bnck areas 
' attracted higher premiums, while successful bids in timber areas tended to be only 
marginally above the reserve price. CT, May 12, May 26, 1955. 
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During 1954, Civil and Civic received contracts to built one-third of the new 
government housing stock, while Jennings received contracts to build one-fifth of the 
stock. At this stage, the only private work conducted by Jennings was the non- 
residential building, Industry House. A.V. Jennings claimed before the 1955 Senate 
Inquiry (pp. 1501-5) that 55% of homes handed over to the Department in 1953 and 
54% in 1954 were erected by Jennings. 
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Between October 1950 and the end of 1954, 513 government houses were sold to 
tenants. The aggregate sale of these houses was £1, 285, 530. 
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revealed that only a small proportion of private lessees did not already use 
the full services of an architect. 
The establishment of the NCDC did not ‘crowd out' private investment in 
Canberra. As predicted by local organisations such as the TLC and the 
MBA, the commitment by the Commonwealth government to Canberra’s 
growth encouraged private housebuilding, and, in turn, this enabled the 
NCDC to focus its attention on office building, community facilities and 
sendees, as well as the more ornamental features of the city, such as the 
lake. Within five years of the establishment of the NCDC, private 
housebuilding had overtaken the Government in annual completions. 
Government Housing Allocation and Rentals 
Housing Allocation 
hi an environment of housing scarcity and housing hardship, and in a 
situation where the Department of the Interior was in effect a monopoly 
landlord, it was not surprising that the system of housing allocation aroused 
fierce controversy among local residents between 1945 and 1955. In an 
August 1954 letter to The Canberra Times, Ronald Mendelsohn noted that: 
‘Complaints about the allocation of houses are a hardy perennial in your 
columns’. 
Throughout Australia at this time, State Housing Commissions struggled 
69 
to meet public demand and faced concerns over accountability. In 
Canberra, between 1946 and 1954, the government housing waiting list 
lengthened from 1,000 to over 2.600 applicants. An early example of this 
concern over the allocation of housing and the general housing shortages 
occurred during mid-to-late 1946 after a number of ‘squatting’ incidents, 
nationally and locally. Throughout mid-1946 newspapers had been 
reporting that while many demobilised ex-servicemen were experiencing 
problems finding shelter, there were over 5,000 holiday homes lying vacant 
around Sydney alone. In May, it was reported that the occupation of vacant 
houses by ex-servicemen was to be tested in the High Court. In July a 
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number of homeless families in Sydney occupied the Housing Commission 
Properties Branch, and five days later a group of squatters was removed 
from a new Housing Commission home in Granville which was ready to be 
delivered over to the successful applicant from a recent Housing 
Commission ballot. Soon after this incident, in August, the NSW State 
President of the Returned Servicemen’s League (RSL) warned that ‘the lack 
of housing facilities was the greatest social problem facing discharged 
71 
servicemen’ and was the cause of ‘considerable unrest’. 
On July 19, The Canberra Times was able to report that ‘Canberra has its 
first squatter for some time’ — a 45 year old serviceman who had taken 
possession of a government weatherboard on Lister Crescent, Ainslie. On 
September 10, the paper reported that Mr Don O’Reilly, employed by 
Canberra Steam Laundry and a resident of Canberra since 1925, along with 
his wife and four month old baby, had been evicted from the same house at 
4:46 pm the previous day. After the police had asked the family to vacate 
the premises, Mr O’Reilly, with the help of a carrier, a friend and the 
assistance of the sheriff, loaded the family furniture onto a lorry. The 
Canberra Times also reported that the O’Reilly’s served afternoon tea to the 
eviction party. Mr O’Reilly managed to borrow a tent and a neighbour 
allowed him to pitch it in her backyard. Two days later, it was reported 
that another squatter, Mr Horace Worster, who had four young children, 
was also threatened with eviction from an Ainslie government-owned 
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house. 
Local organisations and other commentators used these incidents to 
question the allotment procedures of the Housing Section of the Department 
of the Interior. A Canberra Times editorial, entitled 'An Ex-Serviceman’s 
Spring’, attacked the Government’s record on housing and its policy of 
allocating government houses: 
# ___ 
The squatters had been staying in emergency accommodation at Heme Bay on the East 
Hills railway line. After a few days of resisting a return to their emergency 
accommodation and camping outside the Granville house they finally returned to 
Heme Bay. 
CT, August 15, 1946. 
Both the Canberra Branch of the Australian Legion of Ex-Servicemen and Women and 
the RSL condemned Mr O'Reilly’s actions and squatting more generally. Mr H.K. 
Joyce, President of the RSL, stated that ‘The whole position of housing in the AC1 is 
tragic, but the League will not and cannot countenance illegal acts’, and pointed out 
that there were ex-servicemen in a similar or worse plight (CT, September 10, 1946). 
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The Government has fallen farther and farther in arrears in its housing 
programme in the ACT, and it is so deeply in arrears that it is unable any 
longer to administer according to the precepts of democratic 
government...Because it is unable to discharge anything like reasonable 
responsibilities, the Government has decided that it shall grant tenancies to 
73 
public servants. 
This charge of discrimination continued to be levelled against the Ministry 
for the Interior over the next decade. 
Not only did the length of the waiting list for government-owned houses 
increase during the decade after the war, the average waiting time for 
applicants also steadily rose to over two years by 1955. For single persons, 
the list was almost meaningless, due to the system of priorities. The severe 
shortages of government-owned housing, the long waiting lists and the 
hardships which many residents were enduring, combined to create an 
atmosphere of suspicion towards the Housing Section of the Ministry of the 
Interior, and throughout the first post-war decade there were persistent 
allegations of favouritism and misallocation of the scarce housing stock. 
As early as May 1946, the Advisory Council demanded access to the 
Ministry for the Interior's lists of people who had been allotted 
government-owned cottages, their location, and the occupation of the 
lessees. Mr A. Gardiner of the Council stated that he knew of a bank 
employee who received a house in three days and had boasted that the bank 
74 . 
manager obtained it for him. Such rumours and stories abounded in post¬ 
war Canberra. As the squatter story illustrates, there were frequent 
allegations that only public servants could obtain government homes. 
Dr L.W. Nott, the Medical Superintendent of the Canberra Hospital and 
an elected member of the Advisory Council, also attacked the ‘chaotic state 
of housing’ in Canberra, calling it ‘a disgraceful state of affairs’. He added 
that the hospital, the police and the clergy were often called upon to assist 
with emergency accommodation for people in need. He also promised that 
at the next meeting of the Advisory Council he would move to make the 
unused Prime Minister’s Lodge available for housing. Furthermore, he 
argued that lists should be supplied of single persons and widowers 
occupying whole houses in Canberra, which, if proper priorities were 
C7\ September 10, 1946. 
74 C7, May 9, 1946. 
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observed, could be sheltering family units. Dr Nott claimed he had a list of 
75 
single persons occupying houses of several rooms. 
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In the midst of the 1946 General Election, Dr Nott, along with Mr A.T. 
Shakespeare, called for ‘a complete and immediate review of the 
discriminatory housing policy of the Commonwealth Government in 
Canberra in view of the complete failure of the Government to carry out its 
declared plans to relieve the housing shortages’. The TLC along with the 
third elected member of the Advisory Council, Mr Gardiner, defended the 
Government on the ground that it was ‘doing its best but has been hampered 
by lack of labour and materials’. However, they also remained critical of 
77 
the housing allocation process. Local Labor Party identities were not 
afraid to attack the Chifley Government over this issue. In June 1946, Mr 
Allan Fraser, MP (Eden Monaro) claimed that the allotment policy was 
discriminatory and was creating an ‘underprivileged class’ in the National 
Capital: ‘If you are not a Commonwealth employee, you cannot obtain at 
78 
present any government assistance in renting a house in Canberra’. 
As the housing crisis worsened, as waiting lists lengthened, and as the 
secretive nature of the system of allotment remained in place, suspicion of 
unfair allocation and selection procedures was continuously refuelled by 
rumours, letters to the editor, questions from the TLC, the Advisory 
75 
CT, September 11, 1946. The Canberra Times ‘Readers Voice’ column regularly 
contained letters complaining about ‘these people who occupy houses too large for 
them’, and about ‘single girls to whom houses are let. Signed “Waiting”’ (CT, June 
21, 1946). 
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77 . The TLC promised to devise a new practicable method for allocation, which ‘will 
remove the suspicions with regard to the unfair allocation of houses which at present 
are so very prevalent in Canberra.’ Mr Ulrich Ellis from Turner expressed a 
widespread concern over the process of allocation: ‘No-one knows on what basis 
housing priorities are allotted; or why it is possible for persons low on the priority list 
to be given homes above the heads of those who have been waiting long periods. 
Obviously, there must be ‘special’ cases in any system of priorities .... But ‘special 
cases’ should be based on avowed principles, known to all citizens, and not 
determined in secret by unknown persons who cannot be called upon to justify their 
actions .... Canberra citizens are treated with the utmost contempt in public affairs.... 
Public criticism is a democratic right. But in Canberra the law of the totalitarian states 
prevails’ (CT September 19, 1946). 
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Council, Progress and Welfare Associations and parliamentary questions. 
For example, in August 1954, Jim Fraser MP (ACT) sought particulars 
from the Minister for the Interior relating to the allocation of a desirable, 
low rent government house on Arthur Circle, Forrest, which had 
previously been occupied by a member of the Russian Embassy, and the 
suggestion that a medical practitioner had received preferential treatment 
over others on the waiting list with greater need. The doctor was already a 
resident in, and practising in, the suburb. 
Canberra’s residential status hierarchy was further complicated by the 
orowth of the Australian National University. Gibbney argues that ‘the ease & 
with which university people were able to evade the problems associated 
with the government housing list aroused the jealousy of those whose 
housing future was, to say the least, uncertain’. The University, in its 
attempt to attract staff, became a significant landlord within the city, and 
fears were voiced during the early 1950s that the institution was crowding 
80 
out private enterprise. Its peculiar residential status tended to accentuate 
the Academy’s separate social status within the city. 
Rental Reform 
The issue of government housing allocation plagued other housing 
authorities throughout Australia and was not unique to Canberra. However, 
one problem that was unique to the National Capital was the fact that, unlike 
most State Housing Authorities, a significant proportion of Canberra's 
public housing stock was built prior to the war. By the time of the 1955 
Senate Inquiry, approximately half of the government-owned homes had 
been constructed since 1939. As rentals were based on the cost of 
dwellings, they were sensitive to historical shifts in building costs. This 
discrepancy between rents according to the age of the dwelling was 
apparent at the end of the war. For houses erected since 1943, rentals were 
37/6 to 45/- per week, while those erected in 1922-1923 were rented for 
18/-. Houses built after the war were subject to the rising building costs 
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Mr H. Barrenger from the Department of Works assured Mrs Stevenson of the 
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The TLC claimed that for a man earning £5 or £6 this was too high. (CT, August 8, 
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and inflation of the post-war era and this was reflected in higher rentals. 
Furthermore, the majority of these post-war dwellings were located in 
areas with fewer services, were smaller in size, were on smaller blocks and 
were often built with inferior materials. There was a general perception 
within the community that pre-war government-owned houses had lower 
rents and were of higher quality. 
Thus, the order in which applicants received houses was only one of the 
contentious issues affecting allocation. Of equal importance during the first 
decade after the war was the issue of the particular houses which individuals 
received. The Arthur Circle case, cited above, would not have received 
such prominence but for the fact that the house was pre-war, substantial, 
and was subject to a relatively low rent. Such characteristics made most 
pre-war homes the target of applicants on the waiting list. However, there 
was much local resentment over the perception that they remained reserved 
for the upper echelons of the public service. Worse still, once occupancy 
was gained, it was possible to purchase these properties from the 
government at prices well below market value and resell for a handsome 
capital gain. 
By the spring of 1954, the Minister for the Interior announced that the 
next step in the development of Canberra would be a ‘review of the rent 
position’. As an indication of the direction of reform, the Minister stated 
that the current ‘rent position’ was that ‘the older and larger homes which 
were mostly occupied by senior men, were subject to a lower rental than 
the newer smaller homes now being built’. Half-an-hour after coming into 
the House, having just signed the order for the rental review, the Minister 
was asked by the local Member, Mr Jim Fraser, whether the rentals of 
tenants on modest incomes in the older pre-war suburbs of Ainslie, 
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Braddon, Reid, Turner, Kingston and Griffith would be increased. These 
comments opened a lengthy debate among local residents and organisations 
over the equity of the Canberra rental situation. Battle lines could be 
drawn between ‘newcomers’ and ‘oldcomers’. 
The ‘oldcomers’ were supported by Mr Jim Fraser MP. First, he pointed 
out, many of the residents of the inner pre-war areas were early residents 
of Canberra and had since retired or were close to retirement. An increase 
Mr Kent Hughes also expressed surprise that Mr Fraser had got onto the question so 
early, hinting at leaks within his Department. 
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in their rentals would inflict a hardship on people whose income was 
limited to a pension. Second, even though the tenants of pre-war houses 
paid, say, 1934 rentals, the houses they occupied were almost paid for. 
Third, the pre-war homes did not have the same modem amenities as the 
newer dwellings. Fourth, many ‘oldcomers’ believed that their cheaper 
rentals should be considered a reward to those who had suffered the 
privations of living in the ACT as pre-war pioneers. Raising pre-war 
rentals would be an injustice to early residents. Responding to claims made 
by Senator R. Wright (Tasmania) that Canberrans want everything yet are 
•' g3 
not prepared to pay for it, the ACT TLC Treasurer, Mr C. Stephens, 
pointed out that when it came to rentals Canberra residents were, 
comparatively speaking, ‘paying through their nose’ and that this local 
situation ‘will become worse if there is a move to increase rentals of older 
84 
homes’. 
‘Newcomers’ and their defenders, on the other hand, pointed to the 
anomalies of the rental allocation system and the inequalities which it 
brought in its wake. The first problem concerned the tendency for the 
Government to allocate older homes with low rentals to persons with high 
incomes, while the newer post-war dwellings with higher rentals were 
allotted to applicants on lower incomes. Echoing suspicions which had 
circulated over the previous decade, some pointed out that ‘it seemed that 
the better type house, in selected areas, was reserved for incoming senior 
public servants’. Second, newcomers also pointed out that many dwellings 
of pre-war vintage were not tenanted by older residents. As these houses 
became vacant many younger households had managed to gain possession. 
Third, the current rental system led to cases where there were areas — such 
as Reid, Yarralumla, Turner and Narrabundah — where houses with 
rentals of 17/6 to 40/- faced others where the rentals are 60/- to 85/-. 
These discrepancies could not be justified in temis of dwelling quality or 
amenities. Fourth, while pre-war houses might lack some of the more 
modern amenities, few of the older residents were willing to exchange their 
pre-war home for a ‘few extra cupboards and windows’ and a rental hike of 
10/-. Fifth, the older residences had the benefit of larger, more private 
blocks denied to the newcomer. Sixth, many applicants who claimed the 
need of a large pre-war home used this as a pretext for purchasing the 
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house and reaped large capital gains on subsequent sale. One case of a 
house purchased by the tenant from the Government for £3,000 and resold 
for £6,000 was mentioned. Seventh, in the event of a rental increase those 
on low fixed incomes such as pensioners would be protected by the 
economic rental scheme. Finally, some newcomers pointed out that if Mr 
Fraser could convince the Minister that rentals of pre-war homes should be 
retained and high rentals of new homes reduced then it would be a stunning 
political victory on his part, but it would be borne by the taxpayer. 
In early April 1955, the Minister for the Interior announced a series of 
rental adjustments which favoured the ‘newcomers’. This decision, which 
was to take effect from July 1955, increased rents on houses built prior to 
1945 on a sliding scale based principally on locality. These increases 
ranged from 25 per cent to 75 per cent. Houses constructed between 1945 
and 1950 were also subject to lower rental increases. On the other hand, 
substantial reductions were made in the rentals of homes constructed since 
1950. 
Placing Canberra’s housing situation in a comparative perspective, 
Sparke has argued that although ‘some might wait two-and-a-half years for 
a government house, at least they obtained them several years before 
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Australians on government housing lists in other cities’. However, it 
should also be noted that pressure on government housing authorities 
remained more intense in Canberra due to the fact that both the private 
rental market and owner-occupation were virtually ruled out as tenure 
options for most local residents during the early post-war years. 
The 1955 Senate Inquiry Recommendations 
Canberra was severely affected by the housing shortage which faced 
Australia in the wake of the Second World War. This paper has examined a 
number of guises which this crisis assumed, ranging from the production of 
dwellings, the shortage of building workers, the financing and distribution 
of housing as well as the specific forms which post-war Canberra housing 
assumed. Throughout the paper, attention has been devoted to the responses 
of the local population to their difficulties and challenges. It also argued 
that, given the nation’s housing crisis and the Government's priorities, 
Canberra could not have developed at a significantly faster pace during the 
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first post-war decade. However, the experience of this decade and the 
debates surrounding the future of Canberra reveal the ingredients necessary 
for the future planned growth of the National Capital. The right economic 
climate in itself would be insufficient to meet tins objective. As Fischer has 
pointed out: 
...a change in the economic and political climate alone was not sufficient to 
fulfil the reviving post-war ambitions ot building a great capital. What was 
needed as a first step was a thorough analysis of the inadequacies of past 
practices of planning and development as well as a renewed agreement on 
the desired qualities of that great capital, and on how they were to be 
achieved. This task was performed by the monumental inquiry of the Senate 
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Select Committee... 
It is appropriate to conclude with some observations on the 1955 Senate 
Inquiry. This paper provides some illustrations of the wide range of 
administrative, financial and supply problems which the Senate Committee 
had to consider, as well as the rich body of evidence from those involved in 
the construction of the city and those living within the city. However, most 
accounts of the period have focused attention on the testimony and evidence 
of ‘external experts’ and the intervention of ‘great men'. Furthermore, 
they have either ignored or trivialised the contributions made by local 
residents. For instance, one planner claimed that of the witnesses who 
provided evidence at the Inquiry, most were ‘representatives of domestic 
interests more concerned with improving their lot than building a national 
87 
capital’. 
Although it is difficult to state with confidence whether witnesses before 
the Inquiry were representing 'domestic interests’, a count of the 82 
witnesses reveals that, at the most, 35 represented local organisations or 
were locals presenting individual evidence. In addition, many of these 
‘local interests’ were presenting joint evidence. A clear majority were 
acting on behalf of either the Government, professional organisations, 
national business organisations etc. Furthermore, during the Inquiry, in 
February 1955, the Senate had expressed its disappointment that only a few 
local groups and individuals had come forward to provide evidence. This 
statement was made three days after local residents and groups had been 
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invited for the first time to appear before the Inquiry (over three months 
after it had been established!). Given their experience of previous 
inquiries, local residents might well have been justifiably sceptical of 
another parliamentary talkfest. 
It is also important to note that the evidence of ‘local interests’ was far 
from monolithic, and as Harrison has pointed out: ‘Expert evidence on the 
virtues of the Griffin plan was divided and some professionals were frankly 
derisive of what they judged to be an anachronism’. It might be more 
accurate to state that much of the evidence of ‘domestic interests’ and 
‘experts’ was complementary. While many planners sought to preserve the 
integrity of the gazetted plan and its grand vision, local evidence tended to 
focus more on overcoming many current practical problems associated with 
construction and labour — fundamental issues relating to the planned 
movement of public servants to the town. 
A close reading of the Senate Inquiry Minutes, combined with an analysis 
of the Final Report of September 1955, reveals that local evidence was 
influential in drafting the final recommendations. This was reflected in the 
Final Report of the Senate Committee, published in September 1955. The 
Report recommended that the ‘present system of divided departmental 
control of Canberra be replaced by a single authority’ and that ‘the 
authority be guaranteed, by an appropriate provision in the enabling Act, 
sufficient finance to permit it to carry out a long-term balancing 
programme’ (Recommendations 3 & 8). The experience of the previous 
five years had underlined that it was the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth to avoid creating ‘boom and bust’ conditions affecting 
Canberra’s construction industry. These recommendations were also 
directed at encouraging ‘continuity’ of work as an incentive for attracting 
contractors and workers. It was also the main precondition for realising 
Recommendation 23: ‘That large-scale contractors be encouraged in order 
to cope with the lag in the construction of buildings and essential services’. 
This proposal had been recommended by A.V. Jennings. However, by June 
1955 the Department of Works had begun inviting proposals from large 
Australian and overseas contractors that could handle 1,000 units, at the 
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rate of 250 per year, for proposed developments in Yarralumla, 
Narrabundah, Lyneham and Dickson. Contractors would be guaranteed at 
least four years work. Department officials claimed this really big 
planning’ was due to the impetus of ‘Operation Administration’, and was 
designed to alleviate competition for labour with other large projects 
. 91 
throughout Australia. 
The Senate Committee also recognised that continuity of work, and 
Government commitment to the National Capital, would attract more 
private investment and private housebuilding. It recommended that 
‘sufficient housing sites always be kept available in order to prevent the 
payment of competitively high lease premiums’ (Recommendation 25). The 
brick issue also received attention through the recommendation that 
‘immediate steps be taken to encourage the production of bricks from 
sources near Canberra...’ (Recommendation 22). However, by mid-1955 
the Yarralumla brickworks was already in the process of retooling, and had 
built a new kiln with a chimney stack which dominated the ‘skyline’ of the 
suburb. 
The proposals of the TLC and the MBA concerning the need to attract 
permanent building workers and tradesmen were accommodated in 
Recommendation 24: 
That to attract and retain the labour force required for the construction of the 
city, married men in the essential trades be guaranteed early allocation of 
houses, or the opportunity of building them for themselves, and that single 
workmen be provided with more attractive quarters, including comfortable 
messing accommodation. 
Recommendation 26 also called for alternative accommodation to hostels. 
An end to the erection of temporary buildings was also recommended 
(Recommendation 35). Furthermore, the ‘temporary houses erected for 
workers at Narrabundah, Causeway and Westlake were also to be removed 
‘at the earliest possible opportunity consistent with the supplying of housing 
requirements’ (Recommendation 39). 
However, despite these recommendations, the number of houses 
constructed did not rise substantially until 976 units were handed over to 
the authorities in 1958-1959. In March 1956, the Government again cut 
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deeply into Canberra’s budget, with subsequent layoffs within the public 
and private works sectors. At a mass rally outside Parliament House a 
month after the announcement, called by the TLC, a resolution was passed 
urging the Government to follow through the recommendations of the 
Senate Inquiry.92 
The Senate Inquiry’s recommendations relating to Canberra’s 
administration, finance, materials supply and labour supply need to be 
placed within the context of Canberra’s post-war experience. This 
experience demonstrated that the physical construction of the Canberra 
vision required the establishment of an authority along the lines of the 
future NCDC. However, it should also be borne in mind that by the time 
the NCDC was established, the worst years of the national housing shortage 
had passed, more labour could be tapped from the Snowy Mountains 
Hydroelectric Scheme, and the NCDC was not faced with the competition 
for scarce resources which had contributed to many of the difficulties of the 
earlier post-war years. 
An account of these ‘conditions’ and ‘vicissitudes’ would be incomplete 
without appreciating the lively controversies associated with Canberra's 
‘growing pains’, and the experiences of its residents, builders and workers. 
92 See Sparke, op. cit., p. 52. 
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